The Peter A. Allard School of Law

Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications

Allard Faculty Publications

2018

Devalued Liberty and Undue Deference: The Tort of False
Imprisonment and the Law of Solitary Confinement
Efrat Arbel
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, arbel@allard.ubc.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Torts Commons

Citation Details
Efrat Arbel, "Devalued Liberty and Undue Deference: The Tort of False Imprisonment and the Law of
Solitary Confinement" (2018) 84 Sup Ct L Rev 43.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Allard Faculty Publications at Allard Research
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard
Research Commons.

Devalued Liberty and Undue
Deference: The Tort of False
Imprisonment and the Law of
Solitary Confinement
Efrat Arbel*

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite numerous calls for reform and restraint, solitary confinement
continues to be both misused and overused in Canadian prisons. The
practice, formally known as administrative segregation under the
Corrections and Conditional Release Act, confines prisoners to isolation
in a cell for up to 23 hours a day.1 The nature of the confinement is harsh:
prisoners are kept in hostile conditions with no meaningful human
contact or support. The cells are bare and small, often “painted with the
excrement, blood, and tortured writings of previous occupants.”2 The
culture is predominantly one of hostility, humiliation, and abuse.3
Segregation wages war on body, mind, and soul. Its psychological
impact is profound, and ranges from psychotic disturbances to
depression to cognitive disruptions, hallucinations, and perceptual
distortions.4 Segregation also drives prisoners toward hopelessness,
*
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1
S.C. 1992, c. 2 [hereinafter “CCRA”].
2
Donald Best, “Solitary confinement is pure torture. I know, I was there”, The Globe and
Mail (October 30, 2016), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/solitary-confinementis-pure-torture-i-know-i-was-there/article32577649/>.
3
British Columbia Civil Liberties Assn. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2018] B.C.J. No. 53,
2018 BCSC 62 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “BCCLA”]. at para. 247; Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 5,
line 15-18; Interview #8 (July 23, 2015), at 10, line 9.
4
Id.
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suicide, and other forms of self-harm.5 The practice is so harmful in its
effects that the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture has
declared that solitary confinement amounts to torture when its duration
exceeds 15 consecutive days.6
For decades, scholars, advocates, and commissions of inquiry have
identified core problems with the law and practice of administrative
segregation, and outlined proposals for reform.7 In January 2018, the
Supreme Court of British Columbia issued a landmark decision in British
Columbia Civil Liberties Assn. v. Canada (Attorney General), declaring the
CCRA’s administrative segregation provisions unlawful under sections 7 and
15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.8 The decision marks a sea change
in Canadian prison law, for a number of reasons. Perhaps most significantly,
the Court broke from what Lisa Kerr refers to as a “tradition of judicial
reticence” that has characterized much of prison law to date, by not showing
extreme deference to the discretionary authority of prison officials.9 Instead,
the Court engaged in a detailed assessment of the rich evidentiary
record presented in this case, and recognized the measurable and welldocumented harms waged by segregation. The Court also identified several
5
See generally: Office of the Correctional Investigator, “Risky Business: An Investigation
of the Treatment and Management of Chronic Self-Injury Among Federally Sentenced Women”
(September 30, 2013), online: Office of the Correctional Investigator <http://www.ocibec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/index-eng.aspx> [hereinafter “Risky Business”]; Office of the Correctional
Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 2010-2011, online:
<http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/index-eng.aspx>.
6
Juan E. Mendez, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2011). Online: <http://solitaryconfinement.
org/uploads/SpecRapTortureAug2011.pdf>, at para. 76 [hereinafter “Mendez”].
7
See, e.g., Michael Jackson, Prisoners of Isolation: Solitary Confinement in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); Michael Jackson, “The Litmus Test of Legitimacy:
Independent Adjudication and Administrative Segregation” (2006) 48 (2) Canadian Journal of
Criminology and Criminal Justice 157-196; Louise Arbour, Commission of Inquiry into Certain
Events at the Prison for Women in Kingston, Catalogue No. JS42-73/1996E (Ottawa: Public Works
and Government Services Canada, 1996) [hereinafter “Arbour”]; Correctional Service of Canada,
Coroner’s Inquest Touching the Death of Ashley Smith (Ottawa: CSC, 2013); Lisa C. Kerr, “The
Chronic Failure to Control Prisoner Isolation in US and Canadian Law” (2015) 40:2 Queen’s L.J.
483-530 [hereinafter “Kerr, ‘Chronic Failure’”]. See also BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 40.
8
BCCLA, id., at paras. 609-610 (also granting a 12-month suspension of invalidity) citing
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. See also Canadian Civil Liberties
Assn. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017] O.J. No. 6592, 2017 ONSC 7491 (Ont. S.C.J.)
(declaring aspects of the administrative regime unconstitutional).
9
Lisa Kerr, “B.C. solitary ruling: A bold move that may finally bring about change”, The
Globe and Mail (January 18, 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/bc-solitaryruling-a-bold-move-that-may-finally-bring-about-change/article37656159/>.
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important criteria for ensuring the constitutionality of administrative
segregation, including the fundamental need for independent oversight and
clear time limits.10
Even with these safeguards firmly in place – assuming they are
effectively implemented and adhered to – potential for misuse will still
exist. Correctional Service Canada (CSC) has long been criticized for its
non-compliance with basic rights safeguards in the administration of
corrections, as well as for its hostile corporate culture and disregard for the
rule of law, particularly in matters of segregation.11 It is therefore likely that
even if the BCCLA decision is upheld and the government enacts a new,
constitutionally sound legislative regime, prisoners will continue to suffer
rights violations in segregation. In this paper, I chart a path through which
to address such violations.
To do so, I turn away from Charter law and toward the law of torts, and
the tort of false imprisonment in particular. This analysis is new: while some
scholars have examined how other branches of tort law can address harms
caused by solitary confinement, none have examined the application of this
tort.12 I argue that when advanced against the backdrop of BCCLA, the tort
of false imprisonment provides segregated prisoners with an effective means
through which to seek compensation for individual harm. I restrict my
analysis to the tort of false imprisonment for two main reasons. First, as an
intentional tort that is actionable per se, false imprisonment does not impose
onerous evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs. Rather, the heavy lifting must be
done by government: once the plaintiff proves complete confinement, it falls
on CSC to demonstrate that the confinement was legally justified. This
evidentiary distribution is well-suited to address the profound imbalance of
power between plaintiffs and defendants in the prison setting. Second, since
the tort of false imprisonment is designed to prevent unwarranted intrusions
on liberty, dignity, and personal autonomy, it can effectively respond to the
harms that are typically suffered in segregation. The tort allows prisoners to
bring individualized evidence of harm, and to seek remedies for both
tangible and intangible losses.13 If substantial awards are issued, the
10

BCCLA, supra, note 3, at paras. 410 and 566.
See, e.g., Arbour, supra, note 7, at 39. See also BCCLA, id., at paras. 37-40.
12
For an analysis of how the law of negligence can apply in the prison setting, see Adelina
Iftene, Lynne Hanson & Allan Manson, “Tort Claims and Canadian Prisoners” (2014) 39:2
Queen’s L.J. 655-683.
13
For a thoughtful analysis of how victims of violence might benefit from bringing tort
claims, see Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, “Protecting the Dignity and Autonomy of Women: Rethinking
the Place of Constructive Consent in the Tort of Sexual Battery” (2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 3-61, at 3-4
[hereinafter “Adjin-Tettey, ‘Protecting the Dignity’”].
11
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financial burden might compel much needed change in culture and daily
management of segregation.
Despite this promise, the tort’s progressive potential has yet to be
realized. As currently applied, the tort does not subject CSC to rigorous
scrutiny. In fact, the courts have shown significant deference to CSC’s
discretionary authority, even in the face of evidence that such authority
was improperly exercised. In addition, even in successful cases, the
courts have issued only paltry general damage awards, generally set at
$10 for every day of unlawful segregation. The courts have justified this
approach by stating that a prisoner’s liberty interests are simply not
worth as much as those of the free. This approach is problematic not only
for its failure to appreciate the profound harm caused by segregation, but
also, as I explain in more detail below, for its unprincipled departure
from the doctrine that governs the tort of false imprisonment.
In what follows, I sketch the law and practice of administrative
segregation in Canadian prisons to provide context for discussion. This
sketch builds on key findings made by the Court in BCCLA. It also
incorporates data obtained from interviews with advocates, lawyers, and
other professionals who have worked with segregated inmates in Canadian
federal prisons, all conducted in the course of this research.14 My goal in
incorporating this data is to present a more realistic picture of the lived
experience of segregation, including the contours and dark corners that are
rarely visible from an analysis restricted to cases alone. This is critical for
understanding the harms at issue in such cases, and tort law’s ability to
address them. I then turn to examine the tort of false imprisonment,
analyzing six decisions that have applied this tort to claims involving
administrative segregation. Highlighting the two central problems noted
above, I develop my critique by analyzing the prison cases vis-à-vis false
imprisonment cases involving the unincarcerated. I conclude by
highlighting the tort of false imprisonment’s immense progressive
potential to effectively respond to the harms caused by segregation, and
urge the need for reform.
14

This project focused only on administrative segregation in federal prisons, and did not
consider segregation in provincial prisons. Interviews were conducted with a total of 20 advocates
and legal professionals in British Columbia and with representatives of the Office of the Correctional
Investigator in Ottawa. Interviews were conducted in accordance with ethics criteria established by
the University of British Columbia Office of Research Services, Behavioural Research Ethics Board.
See Ethics Approval Certificate H15-00995. Research ethics review is a process of initial and ongoing
review and monitoring of research involving human participants. The process requires the independent
evaluation of all proposed research by an independent committee. For more information, see online:
<http://www.rise.ubc.ca/content/human-ethics>.
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: AN OVERVIEW
The CCRA outlines two forms of segregation. The first, known as
disciplinary segregation, is fairly well circumscribed: it can only be
imposed for serious disciplinary offences following a hearing before an
independent decision-maker and is subject to a 30-day maximum.15 The
second, known as administrative segregation, is more discretionary in its
application and often more harmful in its effects.16 Administrative
segregation confines prisoners to a cell for 23 hours a day with little to
no human contact, and has been recognized by the courts as a form of
solitary confinement.17
In its current iteration, the CCRA grants prison officials vast
discretionary leeway in virtually all matters relating to administrative
segregation.18 For example, the CCRA empowers institutional heads to
segregate prisoners based only on a “reasonable belief” that a prisoner
has acted, attempted, or intends to act in a manner that threatens the
safety of the institution or any person within it; allowing a prisoner to
associate with others could interfere with an investigation; or allowing a
prisoner to associate with others would jeopardize the inmate’s safety.19
In practice, these grounds are so broadly worded that prison officials can
segregate prisoners on a whim without any meaningful accountability or
oversight. Also, the CCRA does not prescribe clear time limits on
segregation, and empowers prison officials to segregate prisoners for
indefinite periods of time.20 Notwithstanding the United Nations’
15

CCRA, supra, note 1, ss. 44(1)(f), 41(2).
Id., ss. 31-33 and 37. See also Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations,
SOR 92/620, ss. 19-23.
17
BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 137; Bacon v. Surrey Pretrial Services Centre (Warden),
[2010] B.C.J. No. 1080, 2010 BCSC 805, at para. 6 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Hill, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1255,
148 D.L.R. (4th) 337, at para. 18 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Hill”].
18
CCRA, supra, note 1.
19
Id., s. 31(3)
20
Bill C-56, introduced by the Federal Government in 2017 proposes non-binding time limits
and independent external review. The time limits are initially to be set at 21 days and then reduced to 15
days 18 months after the amendments come into force. If an institutional head orders continued
segregation beyond these limits, an independent external reviewer must review the case (s. 35.2(1)(a)).
The reviewer must also review cases of prisoners who have already been segregated on three prior
occasions or for 90 cumulative days in the calendar year (s. 35.2(1)(b)-(c)). The reviewer lacks real
power, however, and merely makes recommendations to the institutional head. Ultimately, the warden
is not compelled by law to release prisoners after the specified time limits. The warden remains the final
decision-maker, and retains all of the existing powers outlined in the CCRA (s. 35.3(1)). Notably as
well, while the CCRA does not impose clear time limits on administrative segregation, it does require
periodic review, mandating a first review within one working day of placement, a second within five
days of placement, and at least one every 30 days thereafter. See CCRA, id., ss. 20-21. These reviews
16
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position that solitary confinement amounts to torture when it extends
more than 15 consecutive days,21 it is not unusual for prisoners in Canada
— particularly the vulnerable and the Indigenous — to be isolated for far
longer periods of time. Edward Snowshoe, for example, spent 162 days
in segregation before taking his own life.22 Adam Capay spent over four
years in segregation, isolated in a plexiglass box with lights always on,
Kinew James spent six years in segregation and Timothy Nome over 12
years.23 One prisoner whose identity CSC has not revealed was held in
administrative segregation for over 17 years, for a total of 6,273 days.24
The Court in BCCLA recognized that the conditions of confinement
in segregation “are vastly different” from those of the general
population.25 Citing a number of inmate witnesses, the Court described
the cells as small and filthy, with walls “splattered with feces and
smeared with food, nasal mucus, and other bodily fluid.”26 Justin Piché
and Karine Major paint a similar picture. Their analysis of prisoners’
writing on solitary confinement describes time spent in “the hole” as
characterized by a lack of stimuli, lack of space, loss of personal
possessions, limited clothing, bad and monotonous food, lack of
exercise, limited fresh air, inadequate time and facilities for bathing,
poor ventilation in the summer, and inadequate insulation in the
winter.27 The lawyers and advocates interviewed for this project
described similar conditions of confinement.28 According to interview
participants, segregation cells in Canadian prisons are filthy, often
are not independent in fact or in law, and are often superficial in nature. For example, in R. v. Hamm,
[2016] A.J. No. 803, 2016 ABQB 440 (Alta. Q.B.), the Court noted that one prisoner’s fifth working
day review took a mere 12 minutes and failed to “deal with the reason or basis for segregation” (at
paras. 23, 73). The review was “merely perfunctory” (at para. 96).
21
Mendez, supra, note 6.
22
BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 44.
23
Martin Patriquin, “Why Adam Capay has spent 1,560 days in solitary”, MacLean’s
(November 2, 2016), online: <http://www.macleans.ca/news/why-adam-capay-has-spent-1560-daysin-solitary/> [hereinafter “Patriquin”]; Paul Darrow, “Solitary confinement: How four people’s
stories have changed hearts, minds, and laws on the issue”, The Globe and Mail (June 20, 2017),
online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/solitary-confinement-canada-required-reading
/article35391601/>.
24
BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 155.
25
Id., at para. 110.
26
Id., at 114.
27
Justin Piché and Karine Major, “Prisoner Writing in/on Solitary Confinement:
Contributions from the Journal of Prisoners on Prisons, 1988-2013” (2015) 4:1 Canadian Journal of
Human Rights 3, at 22-23 [hereinafter “Piché and Major”].
28
Interview #1 (June 2, 2015), at 14, lines 2-3; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 19,
lines 16-19.
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soiled with blood or feces.29 Cleaning supplies are provided
infrequently, which can drive prisoners to use or destroy their own
clothing to clean their cell.30 While interview participants noted that
CSC provides segregated prisoners with a mop and bucket on cleaning
days, they also noted that by the time the bucket reaches the last person
in the unit, the water is cold, dirty, and ineffective.31 Others noted that
CSC has also been known to keep prisoners in cells that are deemed to
be a biohazard for unnecessary lengths of time, or to segregate
prisoners in cells containing asbestos that have been deemed too
dangerous to enter.32
Segregated prisoners are isolated in almost every way possible.
Physically, segregation units are often isolated from other areas of the
institution.33 Socially, segregated prisoners have either no meaningful
contact, or very limited contact, with other prisoners and guards.34 There
are few opportunities for prisoners to call loved ones or meet with
family.35 Often, they are reduced to communicating with guards and
service providers like elders and teachers through the meal slot in their
cell door, a practice the Court in BCCLA ruled should be “terminated
forever.”36 The intensity of this kind of isolation results in feelings of
profound loneliness and dehumanization. Justin Piché and Karen Major
cite one prisoner’s account, as follows:
Banishment to isolation is like flaking off the end of the earth. You become
an inanimate object and are treated like garbage rotting at the dump. I spent
five months on the fourth tier by myself, never seeing other prisoners….
Guards strictly enforce the silent treatment…. The months pile up and you
begin to lose touch with reality. All you know is the hole.37

Segregated prisoners are effectively cut off from all forms of assistance.
They have little access to support services and programming.38 Psychiatric
29

Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 10, lines 2-5, 12-16, at 11, lines 2-8 and 13-25.
Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at lines 9-17.
31
Interview #2 (June 19, 2015), at 5, lines 21-25; Interview #4 , id., at 10, lines 1-3, 11,
lines 13-25.
32
Interview #4, id., at 10, lines 2-5, 12-16, at 11, lines 2-8 and 13-25.
33
Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 6, lines 21-25.
34
BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 133. See also Piché and Major, supra, note 27, at 18.
35
Interview #5 (June 9, 2015), at 19, line 8; Interview #6 (June 10, 2015) at 11, line 13;
Interview #7 (June 24, 2015), at 9, lines 18-20; Interview #6, id., at 11, lines 20-24; Interview #3
(June 18, 2015), at 5, lines 10-14.
36
BCCLA, supra, note 3, at paras. 129, 138-139, 149.
37
Piché and Major, supra, note 27, at 27.
38
BCCLA, supra, note 3, at paras. 130-132. See also: Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 21,
lines 21-23, at 22, lines 7-8.
30
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support is either unavailable, or is sporadic and superficial.39 Requests for
mental health support often go unanswered due to indifference or limited
resources.40 The lawyers and advocates interviewed for this project also
described such support as being principally aimed not at care, but at risk
assessment.41 As a result, prisoners are often reluctant to disclose their true
feelings or conditions, for fear that their candour would be used against
them.42 Some prisoners may be cut off or denied medication while in
segregation for security reasons.43 Spiritual support and other
programming is either forbidden or difficult to access.44 The isolation is
intense and extreme, and can turn people “into ghosts”.45
The harmful effects of administrative segregation have been welldocumented.46 As Piché and Major maintain, segregation “reduces
human beings to a brutalizing, degrading, dehumanizing, lonely and
meager existence.” 47 Juan Mendez, the United Nations’ Special
Rapporteur on Torture has stated that “solitary confinement is a harsh
measure which may cause serious psychological and physiological
adverse effects on individuals regardless of their specific conditions”.48
Mendez explains that the practice can lead to psychotic disturbances,
anxiety, depression, anger, cognitive disturbances, hallucinations, and
perceptual distortions. 49 Segregation can drive prisoners towards
aggressive and anti-social behaviour, including psychosis, panic, rage,
insomnia, self-mutilation, and other forms of self-harm.50 The research,
39

Id.
Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 24, lines 6-25; Interview #9 (July 24, 2015), at 31,
lines 22-23.
41
Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 10, lines 5-10; Interview #6 (June 10, 2015), at 5, line 25,
page 10, lines 5-10. See also BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 595.
42
BCCLA, id., at para. 295. See also: Interview #1 (July 20, 2015), at 32, lines 2-5;
Interview #6 (June 10, 2015), at 5, lines 8-10.
43
Interview #6 (June 10, 2015), at 4, line 18, at 14, lines 21-24; Interview #4 (June 19,
2015), at 21, line 7.
44
Interview #4, id., at 30, lines 1-9; Interview #6, id., at 5, lines 8-19; Interview #9 (July 24,
2015), at 22, lines 23-25, at 23, lines 5-6, 15-24; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 25, lines 7-8.
45
Michael Jackson, “Reflections on 40 Years of Advocacy to End the Isolation of Canadian
Prisoners” (2015) 4:1 Canadian Journal of Human Rights 57, at 85.
46
BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 247.
47
Piché and Major, supra, note 27, at 23-24.
48
Mendez, supra, note 6, at para. 79.
49
Id., at para. 62.
50
As the Court concluded in BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 247, administrative segregation
places prisoners
at significant risk of serious psychological harm, including mental pain and suffering, and
increased incidence of self-harm and suicide. Some of the specific harms include anxiety,
withdrawal, hypersensitivity, cognitive dysfunction, hallucinations, loss of control, irritability,
40
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as well as the Court in BCCLA, has found that suicide is “proportionately
more prevalent amongst inmates in segregation.”51
As the Court further recognized in BCCLA, the harms of segregation
are particularly egregious when the practice is waged against the
mentally ill.52 The lawyers and advocates interviewed for this project
stated the same, and further noted that long-term segregation can often
aggravate mental health problems.53 These accounts are consistent with
the findings of the Office of the Correctional Investigator, which noted in
its 2009-2010 Annual Report that segregation often exacerbates
underlying mental health issues.54 Prisoners who struggle with mental
illness in segregation “are often viewed as manipulative and malingering,
and their behaviours contrived attempts to compromise security”.55 As a
result, mental illness is perceived as a heightened risk that can be used to
justify further segregation.56 As Kerr notes, for this reason, mentally ill
prisoners are more likely to be targeted for, rather than protected from,
administrative segregation. In Kerr’s analysis, segregation is a technique
that “is often used by prison officials to punish and contain the irritating
and the unwell.”57

aggression, rage, paranoia, hopelessness, a sense of impending emotional breakdown, selfmutilation, and suicidal ideation and behaviour.
See also, e.g.: Stuart Grassian, “Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement” (2006) 22:3 J.L. &
Pol’y 325; Craig Haney, “Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and ‘Supermax’ Confinement”
(2003) 49:1 Crime & Delinquency 124; Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, “Regulating Prisons of the Future:
A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement” (1997) 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc
Change 477; Stuart Grassian & Nancy Friedman, “Effects of Sensory Deprivation in Psychiatric,
Seclusion and Solitary Confinement” (1986) 8 Int’l J. L. & Psychiatry 49.
51
BCCLA, id., at para. 264.
52
Id., at para. 247.
53
Interview #1 (June 2, 2015), at 13, lines 6-13; Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 11,
lines 3-19; Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 23, lines 8-12; Interview #5 (June 9, 2015), at 6, lines
11-25; Interview #6, (June 10, 2016), at 16, lines 8-25; Interview #7 (June 24, 2015), at 5, lines 3-5;
Interview #9 (July 24, 2015), at 15, lines 5-10 and 34, lines 10-14; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015),
at 21, lines 14-17. See also Lisa Coleen Kerr, “The Origins of Unlawful Prison Policies” (2015) 4:1
Canadian Journal of Human Rights 89; Craig Haney, supra, note 51.
54
Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional
Investigator 2009-2010 (June 30, 2010), online: Office of the Correctional Investigator <http://www.ocibec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/index-eng.aspx>, at 13. For federally sentenced women in particular, segregation
placements made in response to incidents of self-harm often exacerbate distress, which leads to an
increase in self-injury or to resistive and combative behaviours. See Risky Business, supra, note 5, at 20.
55
Naomi Moses and Amy Carter, Solitary Confinement in Canadian Prisons: Tort Law as a
Platform for Change (2015), Unpublished, on file with the Author, at 9 [hereinafter “Moses and Carter”].
See also Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 12, lines 7-12; Interview #6, (June 10, 2016), at 3, lines 2-7.
56
Interview #9 (July 24, 2015), at 26, lines 10-15.
57
Kerr, “Chronic Failure”, supra, note 7, at 496-97.

52

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2018) 84 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The psychological impact of segregation is compounded by the
indeterminacy of segregation placements. In BCCLA, the Court noted
that the indeterminacy of segregation “is a particularly problematic
feature that exacerbates its painfulness, increases frustration, and
intensifies the depression and hopelessness that is often generated in the
restrictive environments that characterize segregation.”58 The lawyers
and advocates interviewed for this project similarly described the sense
of extreme hopelessness and desperation prisoners experienced as a
result of not knowing when — or whether — their segregation placement
will end.59 One stated:
I think that is actually the most torturous part of that experience is just not
being able to look ahead. Not being able to plan. Not being able to see a
future. We really need that as human beings. We want to know, you know
what’s going to happen today and then what’s going to happen tomorrow
and what choices to make. Without having any future which you can cope
or count on with anything to do, just unravels you as a human being.60

These accounts are consistent with research suggesting that the
indeterminacy of segregation does violence to the mind.61 Michael Jackson
describes segregation’s indeterminacy as the “ultimate horror”, stating that
people “cannot tolerate a situation in which there seems to be no escape”.62
BobbyLee Worm, who was segregated for over three years, described this
time as a blur of depression and psychological deterioration. In her words,
segregation makes you feel like “you are losing your mind…. Days turn
into nights and into days and you don’t know if you’ll ever get out”.63
Time spent in segregation is characterized by “mindlessly boring
inactivity, and a lack of stimulation.”64 The mental strain is so severe that
many turn to self-harm as a pastime.65 While legislation entitles
segregated prisoners to at least one “hour out” for every 24-hour

58

Supra, note 3, at para. 248.
Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 17, lines 23-25; Interview #3 (June 18, 2015), at 14, lines 21-25;
Interview #8 (July 23, 2015), at 35, line 20; Interview #9 (July 25, 2015), at 31, line 6.
60
Interview #1 (June 2, 2015), at 40, lines 7-17.
61
See, e.g., Lisa Guenther, Solitary Confinement: Social Death and its Afterlives
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), at 196.
62
Michael Jackson cited in Marion Botsford Fraser, “Life on the Installment Plan:
Is Canada’s penal system for women making or breaking Renée Acoby”, The Walrus (March 2010),
online: <https://thewalrus.ca/life-on-the-instalment-plan/>.
63
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period,66 some prisoners are denied the opportunity to spend this time
outdoors or in contact with others.67 In some cases, CSC requires
prisoners to use this time to conduct personal business such as
showering, cleaning, or making phone calls, leaving little time for human
contact, fresh air, or exercise.68 In such circumstances, as Naomi Moses
and Amy Carter explain, the hour out offers “little reprieve from the
austere environment of segregation.”69 On occasion, CSC takes
deliberate steps to sabotage a prisoner’s hour out. One interview
participant described a case in which prison staff purposefully gave a
segregated prisoner coffee, turned off the heat, and left the lights on all
night to prevent sleep, which caused that prisoner to sleep through their
hour out the following day.70
Such conduct is not unusual in the context of administrative segregation.
The lawyers and advocates interviewed for this project described the culture
of segregation as one of abuse and humiliation.71 Segregation is often
deployed as a punitive measure or a raw exercise of power, used to degrade,
demean, or control.72 Interview participants recounted scenarios in which
CSC staff tampered with food, left lights on or off all day, or banged on
doors to aggravate prisoners.73 Two interview participants described
scenarios of segregation staff providing prisoners with razor blades and
telling them to kill themselves.74 One participant described a disturbing
incident where a prisoner returned to his cell from the shower to find a
noose, with staff reportedly telling him that they had “set him up”.75
Another described an example of a male Muslim prisoner, who, contrary to
policy, was strip-searched in the presence of a female staff member and
with significant unnecessary commentary before his placement in
segregation; he was then released soon after, suggesting that the experience

66

Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR 92/620, s. 83(2)(d): “The Service
shall take all reasonable steps to ensure the safety of every inmate and that every inmate is … (d)
given the opportunity to exercise for at least one hour every day outdoors, weather permitting, or
indoors where the weather does not permit exercising outdoors.”
67
Interview #11 (August 7, 2015).
68
Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 18, lines 10-12.
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Moses and Carter, supra, note 55.
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Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 11, lines 13-25.
71
Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 5, lines 15-18; Interview #8 (July 23, 2015), at 10, line 9.
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Interview #8, id., at 10, lines 8-10. See also BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 48.
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Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 6, lines 2-4; Interview #3 (June 18, 2015), at 22,
lines 22-24; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 10, lines 8-13.
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Interview #2, id., at 6, lines 17-22; Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 4, lines 3-8.
75
Interview #3 (June 18, 2015), at 22, lines 16-17.
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was designed solely to degrade.76 Since segregation units are often isolated
away from the oversight of other staff and fellow prisoners, segregation
staff can more easily engage in abusive behaviour without consequence.77
While prison culture generally discourages prisoners from speaking
out against abuse, those who wish to do so have few options available to
them. The internal complaints process is largely ineffective: even when
prisoners report abuse, most complaints are dismissed as incredulous.78
Outside the internal process, prisoners may challenge segregation orders
through habeas corpus applications, but this remedy only provides
release and does not compensate for harm. It is also not uncommon for
CSC to transfer or release segregated prisoners if a habeas application is
advanced, which can render the matter moot.79 As Moses and Carter
explain, CSC’s ability to “quickly shift the sands” denies a prisoner the
opportunity to seek accountability, such that the “potentially empowering
quality of the legal remedy is rendered hollow”.80 While prisoners may
seek more expansive remedies through judicial review, access to justice
barriers make these remedies difficult to access.81 Prisoners may also
face a host of additional barriers when seeking justice. As Kerr clarifies:
[n]ormal delays in court proceedings often make cases moot, and the
federal Correctional Service settles viable cases before hearing and
insists on non-disclosure clauses. It is also difficult to access penal
institutions and even more difficult to access isolation units.82

When cases do go forward courts generally take a “hands-off”
approach to reviews of correctional decision-making, and grant
considerable deference to the discretionary authority of CSC.83
76
Interview #8 (July 23, 2015), at 28, lines 4-25, at 29, lines 2-10. See also CCRA supra,
note 1, s. 48:
A staff member of the same sex as the inmate may conduct a routine strip search of an
inmate, without individualized suspicion,
(a) in the prescribed circumstances, which circumstances must be limited to situations in
which the inmate has been in a place where there was a likelihood of access to
contraband that is capable of being hidden on or in the body; or
(b) when the inmate is entering or leaving a segregation area.
77
Interview #3 (June 18, 2015), at 20, lines 16-19; Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 5,
lines 16-18; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 6, lines 22-26, at 7, lines 1-4, at 10, line 3.
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Interview #4, id., at 9, lines 9-13.
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Moses and Carter, supra, note 55, at 5.
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By turning to tort law, prisoners can potentially gain access to
remedies that administrative and public law are ill-suited to address.
A tort claim can respond to the changing circumstances of a prisoner, and
will not be rendered moot by virtue of release or transfer.84 Tort hearings
also allow prisoners to present evidence of harm, which is critical for
recognizing the lived experience of administrative segregation. The
benefits of tort litigation do not end there. As Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey
notes, findings of liability in tort “not only constitute a formal and public
recognition of plaintiffs’ victimization and perpetrator responsibility for
victimization”, they also have broader therapeutic benefits.85 In the
context of administrative segregation, tort litigation might provide
prisoners with some measure of vindication or psychological relief.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, a tort claim can result in
individualized damage rewards to compensate a plaintiff for harms
suffered in segregation. As noted briefly above, however, the false
imprisonment cases that have been decided to date have failed to achieve
tort law’s progressive potential.

III. APPLYING THE TORT OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT
The tort of false imprisonment is relatively easy to establish: the
claim is actionable per se once the plaintiff proves a total confinement
imposed in a direct and intentional manner without lawful
justification.86 There must be a “total restraint” on the liberty of the
plaintiff, imposed either by physical confinement or threat of force.87
As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in Frey v. Fedoruk, the
burden is not an onerous one to discharge: the plaintiff “need not
prove that the imprisonment was unlawful or malicious, but
establishes a prima facie case if he proves that he was imprisoned by
the defendant”.88 Originally designed to protect disenfranchised serfs,
84

Interview #15 (July 10, 2015).
Adjin-Tettey, “Protecting the Dignity” supra, note 13, at 4. See also Elizabeth
Adjin-Tettey, “Righting Past Wrongs Through Contextualization: Assessing Claims of Aboriginal
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in its contemporary application the tort acts as a check on unlawful
use of power and is often used to contest improper treatment at the
hands of police officers, security guards, and other similarly situated
defendants.89 While a number of defences can be raised to dispute
liability in false imprisonment, the most common is proof of the
proper exercise e of legal authority, which provides a complete
defence.90
While the common law has recognized that prisoners can make claims
of false imprisonment since 1835, Canadian courts only began to apply
the tort in the prison context in the early 1990s.91 The courts initially
refused to allow segregated prisoners to bring false imprisonment claims,
on the rationale that the tort should only protect the liberty of those who
are already free. The British Columbia Court of Appeal definitively
rejected this proposition in R. v. Hill,92 reasoning that administrative
segregation does more than simply confine a prisoner to one part of the
prison. Rather, in keeping with the Supreme Court of Canada’s
statements in Martineau v. Matsqui Institution, the Court recognized that
administrative segregation constitutes a “prison within a prison” and
deprives prisoners of residual liberty interests.93 Hill provides that where
lawful authority is lacking or where negligence is found, administrative
segregation amounts to false imprisonment and is actionable as such.
Despite the fact that annual segregation placements number in the
thousands, there are only eight reported decisions involving false
imprisonment claims arising from placement in segregation.94 Of those, two
89
Robert M. Solomon et al, Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts, 8th ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 2011), at 70-73.
90
Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, “Tort” (2012 Reissue).
91
Early cases, such as Osborne v. Angle, [1835] 2 Scott 500 and Yorke v. Chapman, [1839] 10
Ad 38, noted that a false imprisonment claim could be sustained by a lawfully imprisoned person. The
first reported Canadian case to apply the tort in the prison context. But see Hague & Weldon v. Home
Office, [1992] 1 AC 58, at 744, in which the House of Lords found that since the “essence of the tort is
the imprisonment of someone who is otherwise free”, a convicted prisoner “cannot sue in this tort for the
interference with his ‘residual liberty’”, a liberty which the court later stated is “quite illusory”.
92
Hill, supra, note 17.
93
Id., at para.18, relying on Martineau v. Matsqui Institution [Disciplinary Board], [1979]
S.C.J. No. 121, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602, at 622, 625 (S.C.C.).
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“Abbott”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. McArthur, [2010] S.C.J. No. 63, 2010 SCC 63 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “McArthur”]; Grenier v. Canada, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1778, 2005 FCA 348 (F.C.A.)
[hereinafter “Grenier”]; Caron v. Canada, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1145, 172 F.T.R. 181 (Fed. T.D.)
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were decided on the basis of jurisdictional matters, and only six were
decided on substantive grounds.95 While this data set is small, the cases
articulate several principles that shed light on the legalities of solitary
confinement. Brandon v. Canada, for example, establishes that CSC must
provide valid justification both for the initial placement decision and the
decision to keep the prisoner segregated.96 Saint Jacques v. Canada
prescribes that the reasons given for placing a prisoner in segregation must
be substantiated by evidence or documentation, and that a failure to
periodically review the segregation order will lead to a finding of liability in
tort.97 Hill reaffirms the principle that prison officials may be liable for
negligence and false imprisonment for failing to review an inmate’s
segregation order.98 This case also reinforces the long established principle
that false imprisonment does not require bad faith and is actionable per se.99
Canada (AG) v. McArthur, the only case from this data set to be heard at the
Supreme Court of Canada, held that prisoners can advance civil claims in
provincial superior courts rather than seek judicial review to overturn
administrative orders.100 While these principles are valuable in marking the
legalities of administrative segregation, two far more striking patterns
emerge from the few reported cases decided to date, as noted briefly above.
First, when applying the tort, courts have shown remarkable deference to
the decision-making authority of prison officials, even when facing evidence
indicating that such authority was improperly exercised. Second, courts have
awarded only paltry general damage awards to compensate for unlawful and
excessive segregation placements. I examine each of these in turn.
(Fed. T.D.) [hereinafter “Saint-Jacques”]. Five of these cases combine false imprisonment claims with
negligence (Abbott, Caron, Hill, McArthur, Robinson). Of these five cases, one (McArthur) includes a
claim of negligent infliction of emotional and mental distress. Two of these eight cases also involve
Charter claims (Robinson and McArthur), and one (Grenier) also involves assault. One case also
combines defamation, conspiracy, abuse of authority claims (Robinson); and one (Abbott) includes
claims of battery, assault, and cruel and unusual punishment (non-Charter). Five of these cases were
decided in favour of the plaintiff (McArthur, Abbott, Brandon, Hill, Saint-Jacques). In McArthur, the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Ontario Court of Appeal’s finding that the plaintiff could pursue
his claim through the Ontario Superior Court, rather than by judicial review at the Federal Court. The
remaining three were decided in favour of the Government (Caron, Robinson, Grenier). Note that
Grenier was initially decided for the plaintiff, but was overturned on appeal.
95
These cases are: Abbott, id.; Brandon, id.; Grenier, id.; Hill, id.; Saint-Jacques, id.; and Caron,
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IV. EXTENDING UNDUE DEFERENCE TO PRISON AUTHORITIES
While Brandon prescribes that CSC must provide valid justification for
an initial segregation placement decision, the reported cases have shown
remarkable deference to the discretionary whims of prison officials when
applying this standard.101 In Abbott, for example, the plaintiff was maced
and shot by guards after placing a butter knife into a garbage can during an
altercation between a guard and another inmate.102 CSC segregated the
plaintiff for his alleged “involvement” in the incident, despite not having
any evidence that linked him to the altercation at hand. In its review of the
evidence, the Federal Court found that CSC had no basis to suspect
the plaintiff’s involvement, stating unequivocally: “Literally from day
one the prison authorities knew that Abbott was not involved.”103
Nonetheless, the Court found that his segregation placement was justified,
since “no clear determination could be made” while the investigation into
the incident was in progress.104 The decision not to impose liability in this
case is striking, as it seems to contradict the court’s own evidentiary
finding. Similarly, in Hill, which involved a prisoner held in remand and
placed in segregated custody under the British Columbia legislative
scheme, the prison authorities segregated the plaintiff for his alleged
involvement in a prison riot.105 As with Abbott, there was no specific
evidence that the plaintiff had participated in the riot.106 Remarkably, in
both these cases, the courts did not endorse the outcome that the law and
the evidence mandated: they accepted that prison officials acted wrongly,
but declined to impose liability. Put another way, they refused to hold CSC
accountable for the harms caused by their conduct despite evidence that
prison officials segregated plaintiffs for unsubstantiated reasons.
These decisions stray from the approach taken in other false
imprisonment settings. At its core, the legal authority defence asks for
101
See Brandon, supra, note 94. This pattern is not unique to tort law. In the context of
constitutional claims, Kerr describes how prison officials who are challenged in court tend to cloak
their impugned treatment of prisoners in claims of expertise. See: Lisa Kerr, “Contesting expertise in
prison law” (2014) 60(1) McGill L.J. 43, at 74. See also: Debra Parkes, “Solitary Confinement,
Prisoner Litigation, and the Possibility of a Prison Abolitionist Lawyering Ethic” (2017) 32(2) Can.
J. Law and Society 165, at 166.
102
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105
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pursuant to the Correction Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 70.
106
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concrete proof that authority was properly exercised. Outside the prison
context, this standard has been applied with rigour. In the case of police
arrests, for example, the defence requires police to demonstrate that the
arrest was made on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds that are
objectively justifiable.107 In other words, a reasonable person placed in
the officer’s position must be able to conclude that there were in fact
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest. This test is applied with a
fair degree of precision: the courts have held that it is unacceptable to
arrest a person in the company of someone committing a crime;108 in the
vicinity of a crime or in a high-crime area;109 for speaking out of
frustration in a way that does not constitute a threat;110 engaging in an
activity a police officer could not identify as a crime;111 or on the basis of
an unsubstantiated, uninvestigated tip from a private citizen.112 The
courts have also held that it is not acceptable to keep a person in
investigative detention longer than is needed to secure evidence,113 and
have stressed that police officers must exercise their legal authority
within strict boundaries.114 It would follow that some limitations on the
exercise of legal authority should also apply to segregation placements.
Such limitations, however, are rarely considered in the prison context.
By extending deference to prison authorities on matters of placement, the
courts not only permit CSC to circumvent liability for unlawful or
unwarranted segregation placements, they also obscure the institutional
structures of power at play. In practice, CSC rarely provides adequate
reasons for placing prisoners in segregation. Placement decisions are often
made on the basis of anonymous and unsubstantiated source information,
even when this information is questionable or unreliable.115 When CSC
provides written reasons for segregation placements, these reasons are often
vague and imprecise.116 Piché and Major describe an account in which an
107
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83-year-old prisoner was threatened with segregation because he agreed to
give another prisoner an ice cream bar if he would make his bed in the
mornings, a task the older prisoner was physically unable to do.117 Their
study further shows that CSC has segregated prisoners for public displays of
affection, refusing to be searched by prison staff of the opposite sex, and not
cleaning cells.118 While such infractions may warrant some measure of
punishment, such punishment should not be so severe as to constitute what,
if improperly enforced or lasts longer than 15 days, is a form of torture.119
The lawyers and advocates interviewed for this project noted that
within the prison walls, it is well known that prison officials often
provide “official” reasons that differ from the true reasons behind certain
segregation placements.120 When doing so, CSC frequently hides behind
its lawful right to withhold information in order to preserve the safety
and security of the institution, even when safety and security are not at
stake.121 This tactic is deployed for a variety of reasons, whether as a
punitive tool or a means to pressure prisoners to provide information
about others.122 One lawyer recounted a situation where an assaulted
prisoner refused to identify his assailant. CSC staff placed him in
segregation on the basis that his safety could not be assured as the
assailant was unknown. It later became clear that these same staff knew
the identity of the assailant from the outset, and segregated the prisoner
in order to extract more information about the incident.123 This tendency
has long been documented. As Debra Parkes and Kim Pate explain, for
CSC, “the entitlements of prisoners, whether legislative or constitutional,
can be ignored or restricted when a security concern is implicated, no
matter how important or fundamental the right and how tangential or
117

Piché and Major, supra, note 27, at 9.
Id., at 10.
119
Mendez, supra, note 6.
120
Interview #3 (June 18, 2015), at 7, lines 24-25.
121
Id., referencing CCRA, supra, note 1, s. 27(3):
Except in relation to decisions on disciplinary offences, where the Commissioner has
reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure of information under subsection (1) or (2)
would jeopardize
(a) the safety of any person,
(b) the security of a penitentiary, or
(c) the conduct of any lawful investigation,
the Commissioner may authorize the withholding from the offender of as much
information as is strictly necessary in order to protect the interest identified in paragraph
(a), (b) or (c).
122
Interview #8, (July 23, 2015), at 9, at lines 18-20; Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 10;
Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 23, lines 9-17; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 5, lines 16-20.
123
Interview #1 (June 2, 2015), at 7-9.
118

(2018) 84 S.C.L.R. (2d)

TORT OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT

61

speculative the security concern.”124 In reality, CSC almost always has
final say with respect to the narrative of events that is accepted as “fact”.
Where these reasons do not coincide with reality, the blanket citation of
security concerns may prevent meaningful review and oversight.125
At best, the approach adopted in Abbot and Hill can be criticized for
showing undue deference to CSC. At worse, it can be criticized for
sanctioning the unwarranted rights violations of the plaintiffs involved.
Deferring to the discretionary authority of prison officials, even where
evidence shows that such authority was improperly exercised, strays
from the requirements of the legal authority defence. It not only fails to
hold CSC accountable for unlawful conduct, but also risks authorizing
the very violations of liberty and autonomy the tort of false
imprisonment was designed to protect. The legal authority defence
should compel courts to meaningfully interrogate CSC’s reasons for
placement. To do otherwise would be to reinforce the inequalities that
plague the administrative segregation regime, and to perpetuate the
already severe imbalance of power between CSC and prisoner-plaintiffs,
not to mention the vast majority of unjustly segregated prisoners who do
not have the chance to have their case heard by a court of law.

V. DEVALUING THE LIBERTY INTERESTS OF THE PRISONER
The second striking pattern that emerges from this data set comes from
the courts’ approach to the determination of damages. Five reported cases
have issued damages in false imprisonment caused by segregation.126 In
each, the courts issued strikingly low sums, generally set at the paltry rate of
$10 compensation for every day of unlawful segregation. This formulation
124
Debra Parkes & Kim Pate, “Time for Accountability: Effective Oversight of Women’s
Prisons” (2006) 48 Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 251, at 255.
125
Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 37, lines 22-23.
126
Notably, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged in McArthur, supra, note 94, that
both the plaintiff and his family suffered severe emotional and psychological injury as a result of his
prolonged segregation. The plaintiff alleged that he
suffered losses as a result of four years and six months of involuntary solitary confinement in
the form of ‘severe emotional and psychological injury and harm’ (para. 26 (emphasis in
original)). He was denied private family visits ‘routinely granted to other inmates whose
circumstances [were] similar’, (para. 24) as well as schooling, rehabilitation programs, and
‘inmate leisure activities’ (para. 25). Moreover, he says the same actions caused his wife and
daughter to suffer severe emotional and psychological harm, as ‘they were denied contacts and
visits with [him] routinely granted to other inmates’ (para. 26).
Id., at para. 6. However, the case was heard solely on administrative and procedural grounds,
the Court did not factor these considerations into the assessment of damages.
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comes from the Federal Court of Canada’s 1987 decision in LeBar v.
Canada, which, while not a segregation case, has nonetheless set the
standard for quantifying damages in the segregation context.127 LeBar
involved a claim in false imprisonment brought by a prisoner to contest a 43day delay in his release. On the facts, the Court found CSC liable in both
false imprisonment and negligence, and assessed the quantification of
damages at length. The question turned on the value to be accorded to
Mr. LeBar’s liberty rights, in relation to which the Court reasoned as follows:
Liberty is sweet. Some folk assert that liberty is essential for human
fulfillment and happiness. … Liberty, however, is a conditional right.
One can forfeit it by personal misconduct, or waive it by the free,
informed consent of oneself, or even that of the majority of Canadians
in times of great and dangerous emergency. In the above cited
jurisprudence all of the plaintiffs appeared to be individuals who, all
their lives, prized, cherished and respected their own liberty. All were,
in that regard, very differently situated from the plaintiff herein.128

In the Court’s opinion, Mr. LeBar had failed to properly cherish his
liberty, and had “squandered” it by engaging in criminal activities.129 As
such, the Court dismissed his liberty as “self-devalued”, “cheap”,
“despised”, and “self-cheapened”.130 Ultimately, it held that Mr. LeBar’s
liberty was simply not worth as much as that of the free man, concluding
that his liberty “counts for something, but … not much.”131 The Court
therefore compensated Mr. LeBar only for lost earning potential.132 At
the time, this rate was fixed to $5 a day. Doubling this quantum to $10 a
day, the Court awarded Mr. LeBar $430 in general damages for his
43 days of unlawful confinement.133 The Court also awarded $10,000 in
punitive damages to punish CSC for what it concluded amounted to
oppressive and abusive conduct.134
Despite the legal and material differences between imprisonment and
segregation, the courts have nonetheless applied the LeBar standard
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in the administrative segregation cases, with only a few exceptions.135 In
Brandon,136 for example, the plaintiff was found with a female staff
member in an unauthorized area. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 22
days of punitive dissociation, a form of segregation, by discipline court.
After seven days, the remaining sentence was suspended, but the plaintiff
was kept in dissociation for an additional 40 days. After another
conversation with a female staff member some time later, the plaintiff was
placed in administrative segregation for an additional 28 days. The Court
held that the plaintiff was falsely imprisoned on the basis that CSC could
not prove that the additional time spent in segregation was justified. The
Court did not discuss the harms caused to the plaintiff, but simply awarded
$680 in general damages for 68 days of unlawful confinement.137
Saint-Jacques follows a similar pattern. This case involved a claim by a
plaintiff who was placed in administrative segregation for 80 days after
refusing to take a tuberculosis test following a transfer from another facility.
The plaintiff refused to take this particular test on the basis of an allergy, and
agreed to all other forms of testing. Finding in favour of the plaintiff, the
Court held that CSC could not justify the segregation, as the plaintiff’s
refusal to take the test did not pose a threat to the order and discipline of the
institution. The Court also found that CSC had failed to conduct the required
30-day reviews. It rebuked CSC for its “oppressive and arbitrary actions”,
and awarded the plaintiff $2,000 in punitive damages. As for general
damages, the Court awarded only a trifling $800. In line with LeBar, the
Court reasoned that the plaintiff’s liberty was simply not worth much, on the
basis that had he “not been kept in administrative segregation, the plaintiff
would not have been at liberty like any law-abiding individual, but would
still have been an inmate in a penitentiary.”138
Since the tort of false imprisonment does not ask the court to assess
whether the plaintiff’s liberty is “deserving” of compensation, there is no
principled basis for differentiating the liberty of the imprisoned from the
135
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liberty of the free. Since its earliest inception in the thirteenth century, false
imprisonment was designed to serve an emancipatory purpose.139 An
instantiation of the writ of trespass vi et armis — or trespass on the person
— it was conceived as a means by which disempowered plaintiffs would
be compensated for forceful deprivations of liberty by more powerful
defendants.140 False imprisonment began as an action to protect the
individual liberty of disenfranchised serfs in England, with the earliest
cases in the thirteenth century.141 Henry de Bracton, who authored the first
systematic analysis of English common law, remarked in 1229 that false
imprisonment was designed to protect against deprivations of liberty.142
From the late fifteenth to the early sixteenth century, false
imprisonment moved from targeting lords and landowners towards the
abuse of police and judicial power — an orientation that endures
today.143 Even in its earliest iterations the tort was actionable per se, and
punitive damages were available in its application.144 This bears out the
historical logic that false imprisonment has always intended to serve
compensatory, punitive, and deterring purposes. In its contemporary
iteration, the tort is driven by the same underlying goals.145
To that end, the case law provides some examples of courts issuing
punitive damages for the purpose of condemning or deterring
inappropriate action by CSC. In Abbot, for example, after the initial
segregation described above, CSC segregated the plaintiff for 100
additional days, several months after the incident at issue,
notwithstanding that all charges against him had been dropped. The
Court imposed liability in false imprisonment for these 100 days, finding
“no basis in law or in fact [for keeping] the plaintiff in segregation”.146
The Court’s findings are scathing: it rebuked CSC for its “bald-face lie”,
noting that the paperwork used to justify this segregation placement
139
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was fabricated and embellished, that prison authorities were “way out
of line,” and that “someone, somewhere was being malicious.”147
Appropriately, the Court awarded $10,000 in punitive damages for
CSC’s “oppressive”, “abusive”, and “malicious” conduct. As with SaintJacques, however, the Court focused almost exclusively on punishing
CSC, rather than compensating the plaintiff. Adopting LeBar, the Court
awarded the plaintiff only $1,000 in general damages for these same
100 days. The broader normative and legal effects of this award are
significant. Punitive damages are non-compensatory by nature, and are
awarded to “punish the defendant when his conduct has been particularly
vicious, premeditated, high handed, or disgraceful”.148 While high
punitive damage awards send an important message to CSC, paltry
general damage awards send an equally important message to plaintiffs,
namely, the violations of their rights simply do not count for much.
This approach to the determination of damages is also troubling in its
failure to give meaning to one of the most basic principles of Canadian
tort law: that damage awards must strive to put the plaintiff in the
position they would have been in had the harm not occurred.149
Compensating a segregated prisoner for lost wages does little to restore
them to their original position, and ignores what Adjin-Tettey refers to as
“the primacy of plaintiffs’ rights under Canadian tort law”.150 A growing
body of literature suggests that the harms of segregation are not always
alleviated upon release, and can plague prisoners forever. Summarizing
this research, the Court in BCCLA concluded that many prisoners
are likely to suffer permanent harm as a result of their confinement.
This harm is most commonly manifested by a continued intolerance of
social interaction, which has repercussions for inmates’ ability to
successfully readjust to the social environment of the prison general
population and to the broader community upon release from prison.151

These accounts accord with Jackson’s research, which points to the
severe psychological after-effects of segregation, particularly the potential
for post-traumatic stress.152 His research shows that segregation continues
147
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to impact prisoners’ relationships with other inmates and staff, as well as
with family members.153 Piché and Major state that segregation can
“permanently scar individuals”, and that its ramifications “often extend
well beyond the time prisoners spend in isolation.”154 They note that even
after release, prisoners continue to experience “perceptual distortions and
hallucinations, affective disturbances, difficulty with thinking, memory
and concentration difficulties, disturbances of thought content, and
problems with impulse control”.155 Importantly as well, segregation may
impact a prisoner’s prospects for rehabilitation, be it with respect to their
security re-classification status, program participation, or conditional
release outcomes.156 A damage award based on LeBar’s $10/day standard
does nothing to address the broader effects that segregation has on the life
of the individual. For the law of tort to meet the goal of restoring
the plaintiff’s original condition, courts should weigh evidence of the longterm impact of segregation on the individual — both as regards their
mental health and rehabilitation prospects — and award damages not just
for harms suffered but also for cost of future care. In cases involving
Indigenous plaintiffs, courts should assess such evidence mindful of the
pervasive violence and systemic prejudices faced by Indigenous prisoners
in corrections, and assess damages accordingly.
Outside the prison context, courts have compensated plaintiffs
considerably more effectively in false imprisonment cases. In its 1969
decision in Bahner, for example, the British Columbia Supreme Court
awarded the plaintiff $4,000 in general damages and an additional $2,000
in punitive damages in false imprisonment for wrongful detention and
public humiliation.157 The plaintiff, described by the Court as “young,
lively, educated and intelligent”, was arrested for intoxication in a public
place while dining at a hotel restaurant, notwithstanding the fact that he
“was not in any way or at any time even slightly intoxicated.”158 The
arrest occurred in view of the public, after the plaintiff and his friend
refused to pay for a bottle of wine they did not drink. The Court took
issue with the defendants’ needlessly callous conduct, and justified the
high damage award on the basis that the “degradation consequent upon
153
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the experience suffered by the plaintiff is sore and not easily
forgotten.”159 In its 1975 decision in Dalsin et al. v. T. Eaton Co. Canada
Ltd., the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench awarded the plaintiffs $2,000 in
compensatory and exemplary damages for being falsely accused of
stealing a pair of jeans.160 Both plaintiffs were held for roughly
30 minutes in the backroom of a department store, during which they
were mistreated, insulted, and berated. The Court justified the high
damage award in this case by noting the intense humiliation suffered by
the plaintiffs, including the “stares of onlookers as they left the store.”161
This pattern emerges from a number of additional cases: $2,000 in
general damages for the laying of an unsubstantiated criminal charge,162
$2,700 in general damages for being falsely accused of stealing groceries
and detained for 45 minutes,163 and $4,000 in general damages for a
deeply humiliating detention lasting 45 minutes on suspected shoplifting
charges.164
Other courts have issued far more significant damage awards in cases
involving more intense humiliation. Given the factual specificity of these
cases, it is worth canvassing a few in detail. For example, in a 1997 case
involving three young girls who were arrested by police in a “traumatic
manner” on the basis of an unsubstantiated tip that they had stolen a
teddy bear, the court awarded each plaintiff $10,000 in damages, to
compensate for the “extreme emotional abuse” and “continuing mistrust
and fear of the police.”165 In 1999, in a case arising from a lengthy and
unlawful detention at a department store involving handcuffing,
humiliation, and excessive force, the Court awarded $23,000 in damages
to compensate the plaintiff for the indignity he suffered.166 In a 2012 case
involving a plaintiff who was wrongly detained and handcuffed in a
hospital while visiting his mother during her chemotherapy treatment,
and later taken into police custody, the Court awarded $15,000 in
159
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damages to compensate for trauma, suffering, and humiliation.167 In a
2014 case, the Court ordered $25,000 to a plaintiff for wrongful arrest
and detention by police including handcuffing, strip-searching, and other
humiliating treatment.168 In perhaps the most extreme example, in a 2013
case, the Court awarded $50,000 to a medical professional who was
involuntarily detained for psychiatric care for unsubstantiated reasons.169
While the analysis in each of these cases is very fact-specific, a clear
trend emerges: when compensating the false imprisonment of the free,
courts are far more likely to award high general damage awards. These
cases place significant value on the harm caused to the individual, even
when the violations to liberty and autonomy are less extreme than in the
prison setting. Courts are much more likely to compensate the
unincarcerated for public embarrassment, humiliation, insult, or
mistreatment, and to consider evidence of injury to feelings and
reputation when doing so. On the whole, and in contrast, in the prison
context courts do not fairly compensate — or even recognize — the
harms suffered by prisoners in unlawful segregation, and reject the very
premise that a prisoner’s liberty should count as much as the liberty of
the free. Seen in this light, the damages issued in the prison cases emerge
not just as callous, but also as unprincipled.
The tort of false imprisonment is designed to protect from
unwarranted invasions of one’s person. It is a means by which courts
can regulate social interactions, and ensure that legal authority is not
used to deprive plaintiffs of liberty interests without justification.
Those liberty interests are just as worthy of protection in the darkest
corners of the prison, where tort law rarely goes. As Louise Arbour
reminds: “When a right has been granted by law, it is no less important
that such right be respected because the person entitled to it is a
prisoner.”170 By showing undue deference to the discretionary
authority of prison officials, and devaluing the liberty interests of
prisoners rights in the assessment of damages, the courts fail to heed
Arbour’s important words. For the tort of false imprisonment to
achieve its progressive potential, courts must “resist the temptation to
trivialize the infringement of prisoners’ rights as either an insignificant
167
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infringement of rights, or as an infringement of the rights of people
who do not deserve any better”,171 and embrace a jurisprudential shift
in the determination of administrative segregation cases.

VI. CONCLUSIONS
There are many barriers that might prevent prisoners from bringing
tort claims to contest unlawful segregation. Access to justice remains a
persistent problem. Prisoners often have limited financial resources, and
legal aid typically does not cover legal assistance for civil remedies.
Many also face additional barriers, like marginalization, poverty, low
literacy, or mental illness, which might inhibit their ability to reach out
for assistance.172 Prisoners are also institutionally marginalized, and as
Parkes reminds, profoundly “vulnerable to majoritarian indifference and
excesses of state power”.173 The institutional environment of the prison
discourages legal action, providing few resources for self-advocacy,
limited access to legal calls and visits, and, at times, further burdening
would-be plaintiffs with the active dissuasion of ad hoc segregation
terms meted out by correctional staff.174 Prisoners may also view the
legal system with cynicism and mistrust, and may not believe in its
ability to compensate or otherwise assist them.175
Despite these barriers, tort law offers a viable means through which
plaintiffs can challenge the improper use of segregation in the daily
management of corrections. Even if the BCCLA decision is upheld on
appeal, and the safeguards it outlines are effectively implemented,
segregation will continue to be used improperly and give rise to
unimaginable harms. As Adjin-Tettey notes, if tort law is to advance the
goals of justice, it must value and protect plaintiff rights in ways that are
attentive to their unique circumstances, as situated in larger systems of
power and violence.176 Against the backdrop of BCCLA, every new tort
171
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case presents an opportunity for prisoner plaintiffs to provide a first-hand
account of their experiences. Such evidence could trigger a judicial shift
in the understanding of the lived experience of segregation, as well as
broader structures that enable and perpetuate its violence. In time, this
shift might enable judges to compensate plaintiffs more effectively for
the harms suffered in segregation. With its broad focus on all manners of
unlawful imprisonment, the tort can also be used to contest segregationlike placements that are not legally classified as solitary confinement, but
that closely resemble it in practice. Substantial damage awards might
compel CSC to shift its institutional culture and ensure greater adherence
to the rule of law in the daily management of segregation. A judicial shift
away from excessive deference and the devaluation of prisoner rights in
the assessment of damages could not only bring a sea change in the law
of torts, it could also advance the law’s promise to protect the dignity,
autonomy, and liberty interests of all persons. To do otherwise would be
to risk authorizing the very violations of liberty and autonomy the tort of
false imprisonment was designed to prevent.

